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Analysis of the Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on the Performance of Chinese Listed Companies: A Case Study of Internet Companies

作者:Liu Yongjiang

院校:University of San Carlos, Philippines

摘要:This study focuses on internet companies and examines the impact of employee stock ownership plans based on incentive theory on the performance of Chinese listed companies. The results indicate that both the employee stock ownership ratio and employee stock ownership plan reward mechanisms have a significant positive impact on company performance. This suggests that by increasing the employee stock ownership ratio and implementing effective reward mechanisms in employee stock ownership plans, companies can achieve better economic and financial performance. Employee stock ownership can motivate employees to actively participate in achieving company goals and enhance their sense of responsibility and ownership. Additionally, effective reward mechanisms provide employees with incentives, further increasing their engagement and innovative capabilities. On the other hand, company size has a significant negative impact on performance. This implies that as company size increases, performance may decline. One possible explanation is that decision-making processes become more complex and slow in large organizations, leading to decreased execution efficiency. Furthermore, large companies face challenges in coordination and communication, which may limit team collaboration and innovation capabilities. In addition to employee stock ownership and company size, other factors such as leadership quality, market competition environment, and industry characteristics should be comprehensively considered when evaluating company performance. This will help develop more comprehensive and precise strategies and measures to enhance overall company performance and competitiveness.

关键词

Employee stock ownership plan; Performance; Chinese listed companies; Internet companies

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References
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