作者:Liu Yongjiang
院校:University of San Carlos, Philippines
Employee stock ownership plan; Performance; Chinese listed companies; Internet companies
References
[1] Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (2015). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Vol. 1, pp. 251-330). Elsevier.
[2] Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (2016). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
[3] Bengtsson, O., & Hsu, D. H. (2017). Monitoring versus incentive compatibility: The role of debt in managerial compensation. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(10), 3424-3458.
[4] Li, F., & Zhang, X. (2018). CEO compensation and firm performance: Evidence from China's listed firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 162-177.
[5] Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2020). Active investors, monitoring, and corporate valuation. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(9), 4312-4352.
[6] Kim, J., & Longest, K. C. (2017). Employee ownership and firm performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Business Research, 78, 133-147.
[7] Durán, P., Kaminski, J., & Rodrigo, G. (2019). The effects of employee share ownership on productivity: Evidence from France. Journal of Corporate Finance, 54, 80-96.
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